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Each mineral is a real philological problem.1 
 
Future commentary on Dante belongs to the natural sciences… No one has yet approached Dante with a 
geologist’s hammer, in order to ascertain the crystalline structure of his rock, in order to study the particles 
of other minerals in it, to study its smoky colour, its garish patterning, to judge it as a mineral crystal which 
has been subjected to the most varied series of accidents.2 
 
 
 
What happens to language after the post-linguistic turn? 
In what does a speculative approach to religion consist? 
Such are the two questions around which this essay is structured. It is not my 
purpose to give a comprehensive answer to either question; rather, I am concerned 
with one very specific approach that could be taken, and this is the approach of F.W.J. 
Schelling. Schelling has never been so relevant, and this is in no small part thanks to 
Iain Hamilton Grant’s Philosophies of Nature after Schelling. Grant’s work–part of 
the recent resurgence in speculative philosophies—has been instrumental in 
presenting Schelling’s Naturphilosophie as a viable pursuit for philosophy in the 
wake of Deleuze. This chapter is intended as a “regional application” of Grant’s 
presentation of Schelling onto philosophy of language and religion. It is important to 
stress straight-off that, while language and the numinous may well be two of the 
deconstructionist’s favourite tools for undermining theoretical discourse, this chapter 
has no such aim. This chapter is and remains an exercise in filling in the gaps. 
Much could be written about religion in Schelling’s corpus, and even about its role 
in Grant’s interpretation of it. I am interested, however, in providing an account which 
answers both of the above questions simultaneously. In order to do so, I will begin by 
pursuing the question of language, and only towards the end of the paper link it up 
with considerations of religion. The dual answer, I will conclude, is to be found in 
Schelling’s The Deities of Samothrace which identifies etymological enquiry into 
divine names with geological excavation. 
 
 
1. Testing the Extensity of Speculative Philosophy 
The past few years have witnessed a marked speculative turn in Continental 
philosophy—not only through the gradual appropriation of Deleuze and Badiou by 
the philosophical mainstream, but also through a number of post-Deleuze/Badiou 
                                               
1 F.W.J. Schelling, Werke vol. 5, ed. K.F.A. Schelling (Stuttgart: Cotta, 1856-61), 247; F.W.J. Schelling, On 
University Studies, trans. E.S. Morgan and ed. Norbert Guterman (Athens: Ohio UP, 1966), 40. 
2 Osip Mandelstam, “Conversation about Dante” in Selected Poems, trans. Clarence Brown and W.S. Merwin 
(New York: New York Review, 1973), 119, 128.  
philosophical experiments which have labelled themselves “speculative”. While to 
call these common experiments in speculative philosophy a “movement” may well be 
both premature and reductive, it seems undeniable that they exemplify a new impetus 
in Continental thought. Iain Hamilton Grant has been one of the foremost pioneers of 
this new-found speculative bent. His reading of Schelling has become a key reference 
point for thinking through what a re-injection of the speculative into philosophy 
would look like. It is Grant’s Schelling, of course, with whom this chapter is primarily 
concerned; however, before turning to Grant’s project in detail, it is worth considering 
the collective “speculative vision”—especially on the topics of language and religion. 
 
Like all new philosophical movements, recent speculative thought has constructed 
its own genealogy. Kant is here the central figure, and his centrality is ensured by 
means of a double gesture. On the one hand, all philosophy since 1780 is dependent 
upon and determined by Kant’s (dis)solution of the problems of the philosophical 
tradition, but, on the other hand, this (dis)solution is seen as “more or less exhausted” 
and urgently in need of surpassing.3 The task of speculation is to overcome the 
questions of access and representation which Kant bequeathed to philosophy, to 
rediscover, in Meillassoux’s words, “the great outdoors, the absolute outside of pre-
critical thinkers.”4 
Recent speculative experiments have also attained self-identity by defining 
themselves against many of the trends of twentieth century philosophy (which, it is 
claimed, were still in thrall to the post-Kantian settlement). In no respect is this more 
evident than in their negative attitude to “the linguistic turn” and “the theological 
turn”. This critical attitude is most virulent with respect to language. The linguistic 
turn at the beginning of the twentieth century is the most extreme manifestation of the 
Kantian (dis)solution of the problems of the philosophical tradition. Language is 
another form the problem of our access to the world assumes. Meillassoux in this 
regard quotes Francis Wolff, “We are locked up in language… without being able to 
get out… We are in consciousness or language as in a transparent cage. Everything is 
outside, yet it is impossible to get out.”5 In a similar way, Harman speaks of “this 
ghetto of human discourse and language and power” to which philosophy has 
confined itself “for the past two hundred and twenty years.”6 Analytic philosophy of 
language and post-structuralism both fall afoul of speculation’s criticisms. They 
turned their attention away from “the great outdoors”, to obsess over how language 
gets (or, more accurately, fails to get) us there.7 
                                               
3 See Harman in Brassier et al, “Speculative Realism,” Collapse III (2007), 368. Grant, it must be said, has a more 
ambivalent relation to Kant than Harman. See Grant in Brassier et al, “Speculative Realism”, 348-50 (in answer to 
a question concerning Schelling’s relation to Kant). 
4 Quentin Meillassoux, After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency, trans. Ray Brassier (London: 
Continuum, 2008), 7. Similar diagnoses can be found in Harman’s attack on the dominance of the subject-object 
relation in post-Kantian thought and Grant’s critique of representation. Graham Harman, “On Vicarious 
Causation”, Collapse II (2007), 172-3 and Iain Hamilton Grant, “Schellingianism and Postmodernity: Towards a 
Materialist Naturphilosophie”, paper presented to the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy in Boston, MA, 
10th August 1998. Available at: www.bu.edu/wcp/papers/cult/cultgran.htm. Accessed 01/11/2009. 
5 Meillassoux, After Finitude, 6. 
6 Harman in Brassier et al, “Speculative Realism”, 381. Thus, Harman writes elsewhere (with Bryant and Srnicek), 
in the twentieth century, “The mediation of language becomes all-encompassing as the phenomenal realm of 
subjectivity becomes irreducibly intertwined with linguistic marks. Again, any possibility of a world independent 
of the human-world correlation is rejected.” It is for this reason they respond, “We propose [the term] ‘speculative 
turn’ as a counterpoint to the formerly dominant ‘linguistic turn’.” (Levi Bryant, Graham Harman and Nick 
Srnicek, “Towards a Speculative Philosophy” in Bryant, Srnicek and Harman eds, The Speculative Turn: 
Continental Realism and Materialism (Melbourne: re:press, forthcoming).) 
7 Badiou’s “Philosophy and Mathematics” is, in this regard, the foundational text for subsequent speculative 
philosophy. Badiou decries “the sophistical tyranny of language” that has ruled over Western philosophy since 
In Philosophies of Nature After Schelling, Grant makes similar criticisms of the 
linguistic turn. For example, Heidegger is upbraided because, in his thought, 
“language… supplants nature as the substrate in which beings adhere.”8 And, more 
generally, Grant attacks “the linguistic idealism that represents ‘nature’ as determined 
solely in and for language.”9 The turn to language in twentieth century philosophy has 
been, according to Grant, largely a forgetting of nature and the possibilities of 
Naturphilosophie—and it is such possibilities that he wishes to resuscitate (as we 
shall soon see). It is for reasons such as these that recent speculative philosophy has 
situated itself on the other side of a post- or anti-linguistic turn, a turn away from the 
obsessions with language that dominated so much twentieth century philosophy. 
Similar things can be said about speculation and religion. There is widespread 
suspicion about the “theological turn in Continental philosophy”.10 Such tendencies 
are extensively critiqued by Meillassoux in After Finitude under the label of 
“fideism”: “The end of metaphysics,” he claims, “has taken the form of an 
exacerbated return of the religious.”11 Post-Kantian philosophy of religion is 
condemned to a fideism which renounces philosophy’s rights, in order to open the 
field to theology. 
 
Such, therefore, is a brief survey of speculative positions on religion and language. 
Much could, of course, be criticised in these somewhat simplistic and rather sweeping 
comments and, if one were so inclined, one could simply point out that speculation 
may well be subject to the same vicissitudes of signification as any other philosophy. 
However, this is not my intention here. Rather, I will assume in what follows the 
cogency of the speculative position (which, after all, has its attractive elements). My 
method of proceeding will be as follows: given these positions, I will explore how far 
they are compatible with one of Grant’s own criteria for philosophy—“the extensity 
test”. 
“Every philosophical construction,” Grant states, “undergoes the test of the 
extensity of its concepts.”12 Elsewhere he elaborates as follows, 
 
[Philosophy] is ‘the infinite science’, and cannot therefore be ‘conditioned’ by eliminating anything a priori 
from its remit… The infinite science must test itself against the All, which lacks neither nature nor Idea. It is 
the extensity therefore, the range and capacity of philosophical systems that is being tested… [Schelling] 
challenges systems to reveal what they eliminate. Insofar as philosophy still leaves nature to the sciences, it 
continues to fail Schelling’s test, and becomes a conditioned, that is, a compromised antiphysics.13 
 
My contention is that speculation’s negative attitude toward language and religion 
raises this very question which Grant himself poses to the rest of post-Kantian 
philosophy. This test of the “extensity of philosophical systems” needs to be turned 
back on Grant himself. We must challenge Grant (and speculative thought in general) 
as to whether his philosophical enterprise eliminates language and religion, and so 
here displays its blind spot. An attempt to construct Grant’s answer to such testing 
will form the basis of the rest of this essay. Do speculative philosophies in general 
                                                                                                                                      
Hegel. Alain Badiou, Theoretical Writings, ed. and trans. Ray Brassier and Alberto Toscano (London: Continuum, 
2004), 38.  
8 Iain Hamilton Grant, Philosophies of Nature After Schelling (London: Continuum, 2006), 6. 
9 Ibid, 16. 
10 Again, Badiou’s “Philosophy and Mathematics” provides a crucial precedent. 
11 Meillassoux, After Finitude, 45. 
12 Grant, Philosophies of Nature, 194. 
13 Ibid, 19-21. Grant is here quoting from Schelling, Werke, 2:56. 
and Grant’s philosophy of nature in particular have the range and capacity to 
provide an adequate account of language and religion? 
Let us pause a moment over what this means–taking language as our example. The 
problem is that language has been seen during the twentieth century as a barrier to 
speculation, as something which stands between thought and being. The play of 
signifiers bars us from the signified. My question, however, is the following: can 
language (and also religion) become an object of speculation? What happens when we 
treat language as one object among others? This, of course, requires bracketing off 
“the play of signifiers”, the disruptive elements of language generally and even the 
very fact that philosophy is propagated in a linguistic medium. However, such 
bracketing may well be worth the effort if it were possible, through this act, to 
conceive of a speculative linguistics in parallel to a speculative physics. In other 
words, the question is: can language be transformed from the universal medium in 
which philosophy takes place into a regional object on which philosophy speculates? 
 
 
2. The Resurrection of Naturphilosophie 
In order to answer these questions, it is first necessary to give an initial sketch of 
Grant’s project and his reading of Schelling, so as to be able to sound out its 
“extensive value”.  
The project is best summed up by the opening of Grant’s contribution to the first 
“speculative realist” workshop: “The basic thing I want to talk about is the 
philosophical problem of nature, and I think this is a springboard for speculation–not 
opportunistically, but necessarily”14; moreover, according to Grant, by far the most 
significant speculative resolution of the problem of nature was provided by F.W.J. 
Schelling. Schelling’s insistence on “the eternal and necessary bond between 
philosophy and physics”15, Grant maintains, is a timeless alternative for philosophy, 
one that puts it back in touch with its speculative roots. “Schellingianism is resurgent 
every time philosophy reaches beyond the Kant-inspired critique of metaphysics, its 
subjectivist-epistemological transcendentalism, and its isolation of physics from 
metaphysics.”16 
Schelling’s Naturphilosophie, therefore, is to be opposed to much of the 
philosophical tradition. In fact, even Badiou (darling of much speculative thought)17 
and Deleuze (Grant’s preferred contemporary philosopher)18 fall short of it. They—
along with the rest of post-Cartesian philosophy—manifest the tendency to 
philosophical antiphysics, Schelling’s bête-noire. “The whole of modern philosophy 
since its inception (through Descartes),” Schelling famously writes, “has this common 
deficiency–that nature does not exist for it.”19  
                                               
14 Grant in Brassier et al, “Speculative Realism”, 334. 
15 Schelling, Werke, 7:101; Iain Hamilton Grant, “The ‘Eternal and Necessary Bond Between Philosophy and 
Physics’: A Repetition of the Difference Between the Fichtean and Schellingian Systems of Philosophy”, Angelaki 
10.1 (2005), 54. As my concern in this section is with Grant’s Schelling: as well as citing the German, I will cite 
Grant’s translation of it (where available) as opposed to other English translations. Where no English citation is 
given, translations are my own. 
16 Grant, Philosophies of Nature, 5. 
17 See Grant, Philosophies of Nature, 8-9 and Iain Hamilton Grant, “‘Philosophy Become Genetic’: The Physics of 
the World Soul” in Norman Judith and Alistair Welchman eds, The New Schelling (London: Continuum, 2004), 
129. 
18 See especially Grant, Philosophies of Nature, 190-7. 
19 Schelling Werke 7:356; F.W.J. Schelling, Philosophical Inquiries into the Nature of Human Freedom, trans. 
James Gutmann (La Salle: Open Court, 1936), 30. 
This forgetting of nature is exemplified most clearly in Schelling’s immediate 
forebear, Fichte. Time and again, Schelling attacks Fichte for eliminating nature from 
philosophy, or, what is the same thing, for treating nature from a merely ethical 
perspective. To take merely one example of Schelling’s criticism, 
 
[Fichtean philosophy] consists of nothing but a moralizing of the entire world that undermines life and 
hollows it out; a true disgust towards all nature and vitality except that in the subject, and a crude extolling 
of morality and the doctrine of morals as the one reality in life and science.20 
 
In such condemnations, Schelling depicts Fichtean “nature-cide”21 to be a result of the 
“ethical process” in which philosophy is entrapped. This ethical process is that by 
which philosophy instantiates the primacy of practical reason at the expense of a 
speculative approach to nature: “the substitution of ethics for ontology”.22 For both 
Grant and Schelling, this ethicisation of nature is “as untenable as it is ubiquitous”.23 
And it is precisely against it that both their philosophical enterprises are directed. 
 
There are two specific symptoms of nature’s elimination and the triumph of the 
ethical that Grant observes in modern philosophy. The first is the sharp distinction 
therein between organic and inorganic nature. When in the third Critique Kant makes 
organisms the key to reflective judgment, he in effect draws a boundary between the 
organic as philosophically significant and the inorganic as philosophically insignificant. 
Nature is limited to life–and that which subsists below this threshold of animation is 
ignored.24 Biology is of interest to philosophy, but geology is not. 
The second symptom of the post-Cartesian forgetting of nature is its 
phenomenalism, and consequently its somatism (i.e. its reduction of the natural world 
to a series of bodies). That is, modern philosophy limits nature to what can be 
experienced, and thus to a theory of bodies.25 This is a product of philosophy’s 
indolence with respect to nature, its disinclination to go beyond the given and uncover 
its conditions. Indeed, when it comes to nature, Kant and Fichte (for example) were 
not transcendental enough—accepting phenomenal experience without considering 
its physical conditions. Philosophy has only been interested in natural phenomena (not 
productive nature) and, as such, cannot get at what exceeds such phenomena (either 
the infinitesimally small or the “arche-fossil”26 or cosmological temporality). 
 
What, then, does a speculative Naturphilosophie freed from “the ethical process” 
look like? The basis of Schelling’s Naturphilosophie, Grant claims, is his rejection of 
somatism in favour of dynamics: “Forces before bodies.”27 Central to this change in 
                                               
20 Schelling, Werke, 7:19; Grant, Philosophies of Nature, 61. 
21 Grant, “The Eternal and Necessary Bond”, 45. 
22 Iain Hamilton Grant, “Being and Slime: The Mathematics of Protoplasm in Lorenz Oken’s ‘Physio-
Philosophy’”, Collapse IV (2008), 288-9. Kant’s third Critique is the paradigm instance of this. It manifests “the 
fatal decay of modern European Wissenschaft from physis to the ethico-teleological.” (Grant, Philosophies of 
Nature, 104) 
23 Grant, “Being and Slime”, 289. 
24 “Postkantian philosophy has repeatedly reverted to organism, to the phenomena of life, precisely to head off 
naturephilosophical incursions. In other words, inherent in the problem of organism… is a two-worlds physics. 
Life acts as an Orphic guardian for philosophy’s descent into the physical.” (Grant, Philosophies of Nature, 10) 
25 In fact, Grant traces this view all the way back to Aristotle, who, he claims, perverts Platonic physics by 
transforming it into a science of bodies. Grant reads Schelling’s Platonism precisely as an attempt to overthrow 
this Aristotelian perversion (Grant, Philosophies of Nature, 54). 
26 The “arche-fossil” is Meillassoux’ label for that which precedes all possible experience. See Meillassoux, After 
Finitude, 9-10. 
27 Grant, “Physics of the World Soul”, 137. 
perspective is a tireless concern with how the phenomenal is generated; it is this 
which is of interest, not phenomenal bodies themselves. 
This change in focus from somatics to dynamics requires the philosopher to go 
beyond what is phenomenally apparent and discover that which exists below the 
threshold of the given. In passing beyond the phenomenal, Naturphilosophie is, 
therefore, able to treat everything which cannot be contained within our human powers 
of representing. Significantly for our purposes, Schelling’s non-phenomenological 
physics is thus able to examine geological and cosmological time-spans, that is, the 
durations which give birth to fossils and to new species. Such periods are inaccessible 
to the individual human’s capacity of imagination; they are, in Kantian language, 
sublime. Yet, in moving beyond the phenomenal, Schelling is able to begin to think 
about “the timescales involved in natural becomings [which] exceed the 
phenomenological capacity not only of individuals, but also of any and all species.”28 
Such is Schelling’s point when he notes, 
 
The alterations to which organic as well as inorganic nature are subjected may have happened in far greater 
periods of time than our lesser time periods can provide a measure for, and that are so great that until now 
no such experience has been lived through.29 
 
At the heart of Schelling’s new dynamics of nature lies the concept of “non-linear 
recapitulation”. It is Carl Friedrich Kielmeyer’s initial exposition of this notion in his 
1793 On the Proportions of Organic Forces throughout the Series of Organisations 
that leads Schelling to exclaim that “a new epoch in natural history” has begun.30 
Basically put, non-linear recapitulation denotes the process by which the productive 
forces which constitute nature repeat themselves in ever higher potencies ad infinitum 
(i.e. without a teleological endpoint).31 The same forces recur incessantly and it is the 
job of the philosopher of nature “to plot their recursion and mutation throughout each 
and every branch of the system of nature.”32 Such a theory of the self-recapitulation of 
forces is non-linear, because, unlike linear recapitulation, it does not posit one body 
(namely, the human) as the end-point of the mutation, as the point where the forces 
perfect themselves.33 Instead, non-linear recapitulation is in principle endless: the 
same proportion of forces can recur in ever higher potencies ad infinitum. 
 
Because it is exactly the same forces that recapitulate in producing different 
bodies, there is no gulf between the organic and inorganic for Schelling and 
Kielmeyer. What is more, nature does not just extend into the geological and 
inorganic, but also into the mental realm. Grant insists that Naturphilosophie should 
be able to explain ideas as well. It is for this reason he comes up with the extensity 
test considered in the previous section: Naturphilosophie to really count as the 
“physics of the All” must be able to give an account of ideogenesis (otherwise it 
would be conditioned by something it excluded). It needs to provide “a dynamics… of 
the concept”.34 
                                               
28 Grant, Philosophies of Nature, 127. 
29 Schelling, Werke, 2:349; Grant, Philosophies of Nature, 139. 
30 Schelling Werke, 2:565; Grant, Philosophies of Nature, 110. 
31 Grant quotes extensively from Kielmeyer to this effect in Philosophies of Nature, 129. 
32 Grant, Philosophies of Nature, 119. 
33 Linear recapitulation is a theory of the analogous relation between different bodies (a microcosm/macrocosm 
relation). It establishes a “hierarchy” of beings with man at the top. Grant thus speaks of “the ethico-teleological 
project of the linear recapitulationists” (Grant, Philosophies of Nature, 131) and its “somatic-phenomenal” basis 
(ibid, 131). 
34 Grant, Philosophies of Nature, 21. 
It is non-linear recapitulation which achieves just such a one-world physics. The 
proportion of forces that produce real phenomena repeats itself in all that exists, and 
so recurs in ideal phenomena too. Schelling’s is “an uninterrupted physicalism leading 
from ‘the real to the ideal’”.35 In Schelling’s words, the task for a Naturphilosophie 
that intends to become “absolute” is to trace “a natural history of our mind”36—“to 
pursue the dynamic process from nature to ideation.”37 
Such “a non-somatic and non-phenomenal dynamic physis of ideation”38 is possible, 
according to Schelling, on the premise that the transcendental conditions of 
experience are located in the dynamic interaction of forces, rather than the play of 
faculties. Naturphilosophie, in Schelling’s words, “materialises the laws of 
intelligence into laws of nature.”39 It follows the self-recapitulation of nature into 
thought, and realises that intelligence “is a simple consequence of nature’s incessant 
potentiation”.40 Consciousness, therefore, becomes, pace Kant, a regional 
phenomenon, one more object among other objects (to use Harman’s language). 
 
Such, therefore, is Grant’s Schelling: a Schelling who rejects the somatism and 
phenomenalism of more dominant strands of philosophy by looking to the empirically 
inaccessible forces which generate the phenomenal world; a Schelling who—through 
the concept of non-linear recapitulation—provides a dynamics which includes both 
the idea and the geological. Schelling’s philosophy is, Grant claims, a speculative 
physics which, as absolute, excludes nothing from its purview–from the oldest rock to 
the newest idea. 
Does it, however, include language and religion? Such is the question to which I 
now turn. I am interested in discovering the way in which Grant’s Schelling could 
make room for a speculative account of these two fields in his absolute philosophy. In 
order to anticipate an answer, it is worth reconsidering the manner in which Grant 
absorbs ideas and ethics into this absolute philosophy. This will provide a preliminary 
clue to how we should expect language and religion to be so incorporated. Grant 
(following Schelling) attacks the “idealist” and “practicist” orientations which 
dominate philosophy and eliminate nature; however, his attitude towards them is not 
merely critical, since—having reinstated a speculative viewpoint on nature—Grant 
returns to the topics of ideas and ethics to show how they, in fact, are regional 
manifestations of nature itself. For Fichte, theory of consciousness is the whole of 
philosophy and “it is only…in [one] small region of consciousness that there lies a 
world of the senses: nature”41; for Schelling, the exact reverse is true.42 The ideal 
realm is downgraded from its position as determining the whole of a philosophy of 
consciousness (through its privileged relation to the subject) to a mere regional object 
of philosophy of nature. Schelling, that is, inverts Kant and Fichte’s “idea of nature” 
                                               
35 Ibid, 11 (quoting Schelling, Werke, 3:272-3). Grant puts it elsewhere as follows, “Nature thinks just as nature 
‘mountains’ or nature ‘rivers’ or nature ‘planetises’, or what have you. These things are the same to all intents and 
purposes.” (Grant in Brassier et al, “Speculative Realism”, 344) 
36 Schelling, Werke, 2:39; Grant, Philosophies of Nature, 45. 
37 Grant, Philosophies of Nature, 172. 
38 Ibid, 113. 
39 Schelling Werke, 3:352; Grant, Philosophies of Nature, 29. 
40 Schelling, Werke, 4:76; Grant, “The Eternal and Necessary Bond”, 48. 
41 J.G. Fichte, “Letter to Schelling, 31/05/1801” in F.W.J. Schelling, Briefe und Dokumente vol. II, ed. Horst 
Fuhrmans (Bonn: Grundmann, 1973), 343; translated in “Selections from Fichte-Schelling Correspondence (1800-
1801)” in Jochen Schulte-Sasse et al ed, Theory as Practice: A Critical Anthology of Early German Romantic 
Writings (Minneapolis: University of Minnesotta Press, 1997), 83. 
42 Hence, he replies to Fichte, “I know sufficiently well in what small region of consciousness you have to situate 
nature, due to the concept you have of it. It has for you absolutely no speculative significance, but only a 
teleological significance.” “Letter to Fichte, 03/10/1801” in Schelling, Briefe vol. 2, 354. 
into a “physics of the idea”. Nature, not consciousness, becomes the subject of 
philosophy. This regionalisation is, what I will dub, the speculative process: whereas 
“the ethical process” is that by which ethics supplants nature, “the speculative 
process” reverses this, supplanting ethics with a speculative philosophy of nature, one 
regional object of which is ethics. It is such a process that I will attempt to locate in 
Naturphilosophie’s attitudes to language and religion. 
 
 
3. Fichte’s Ethical Dissolution of Language 
I will begin with language, for—as we shall discover—it is by pursuing the 
speculative attitude to language that we will end up discovering the appropriate 
speculative attitude to religion. My procedure will be to return to Schelling himself to 
uncover any answer (or intimations of an answer) which he may have given as to the 
role of language (and religion) in Naturphilosophie and, in consequence, which can be 
incorporated into Grant’s account. However, as Hennigfeld points out, language is not 
a particularly popular topic for Schelling: “There is no elaborate philosophy of 
language in Schelling’s corpus; there are, however, a few significant indications of 
isolated beginnings of a philosophy of language.”43 It is two such “isolated 
beginnings” on which I will concentrate in what follows and, through them, I hope to 
reconstruct Schelling’s speculative linguistics. 
 
However, before turning to the first of these “isolated beginnings”, it is worth 
pausing for a moment over Fichte’s theory of language. This is because, in exact 
parallel to the reduction of nature to ethics that Grant and Schelling attack in 
Fichte’s writings, a reduction of language to the ethical can also be discerned 
therein. Language too is subject to the ethical process and, through it, becomes a tool 
of intersubjective interaction.  
Fichte’s essay on the subject (“On the Linguistic Capacity and the Origin of 
Language”) is an attempt to chart “the ‘genesis’ of language transcendentally 
considered.”44 As with all Fichte’s forays into transcendental philosophy, the task is 
therefore to exhibit the primacy of the practical in this field of philosophy enquiry. 
Language, Fichte claims, enables a relationship between subject and subject that can 
acknowledge the pre-existing spontaneity of each party. Through language, “an 
interchange between freedom and purposiveness is revealed.”45 Language is the 
means by which we recognise the purpose spontaneously formed by the other—we 
realise the other is already ethical too: 
 
I wish that the other might know my intention so that he would not act against me and, for the same reason, 
I wish to know the intentions of the other. Thus arises the task of inventing fixed signs by which we can 
communicate our thoughts to others.46 
 
                                               
43 Jochem Hennigfeld, “Schellings Philosophie der Sprache”, Philosophisches Jahrbuch 91.1 (1984), 16. My 
translation. 
44 Jere Paul Surber, Language and German Idealism: Fichte’s Linguistic Philosophy (New Jersey: Humanities, 
1996), 28. 
45 J.G. Fichte, “On the Linguistic Capacity and the Origin of Language”, trans. J.P. Surber in Surber, Language 
and German Idealism, 123. 
46 Ibid, 124. 
Fichte writes elsewhere even more explicitly, “The character of the sign is [an] 
eliciting of freedom by freedom… a summons to free activity through the influence of 
a rational being.”47 Language is a product of intersubjective, ethical relations. 
The Fichtean account of language is, then, a pragmatic account—a reduction of 
language to the ethical. Language is subjected to the “ethical process” just as nature is 
elsewhere in Fichte’s corpus. 
 
The question therefore becomes even more insistent: does Schelling respond to the 
Fichtean ethicisation of language as he responds to his ethicisation of nature? Is there 
a speculative rebuttal of such an elimination of language which parallels his 
Naturphilosophie’s rejection of Fichtean “nature-cide”? 
 
 
4. Schelling’s Speculative Linguistics 
One intimation of a response is to be found in Schelling’s 1811 speech to the 
Munich Academy, Bericht über den pasigraphischen Versuch des Professor Schmid 
in Dilligen. In the Bericht, Schelling is intent on incorporating philosophy of language 
into Naturphilosophie. The first suggestion that this is specifically what he intends 
can be discerned from the following, 
 
One may ask whether there are not… homologous language formations like there are mountain formations 
that can recur in quite different places in the world independently of each other.48 
 
Can words, Schelling asks, be thought of as physical phenomena, produced by 
dynamic forces analogous to those which generate other natural phenomena (like 
mountains)? That is, is a physics of language possible? 
Later in the Bericht, Schelling goes even further, 
 
When one cognises the physical in language, and pursues and arranges the facts of the history of peoples 
and language in connection or at least in analogy to the geological, what wondrous and (at present) 
unbelievable regularity and lawfulness will then appear before our eyes!49 
 
This quotation is crucial, and I will return to it repeatedly in what follows. First, 
Schelling insists on the need to “cognise the physical in language.” This is a 
remarkable recommendation and one that can be flatly opposed to Fichte’s reduction 
of the linguistic to intersubjective communication. Language, Schelling implies, is a 
natural object like any other: it is constituted from natural forces and can be absorbed 
into a naturephilosophical account of reality. Just as Schelling conceived of a 
dynamics inclusive of the idea, so too here he suggests the need for a dynamics that 
takes account of the word. By “cognising the physical in language”, words become 
objects of a speculative physics, the appropriate subject-matter of Naturphilosophie. 
Second, Schelling advocates understanding the history of language “in connection 
or at least in analogy to the geological”. This is key to my present purposes. Here, 
Schelling goes beyond his own initial comparison with mountain formations: 
language should not be merely thought of “in analogy” to geological phenomena, 
but—more than that—“in connection” with them. This connection goes beyond a 
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merely regulative metaphorical relation to a determinative, ontological one. Schelling 
transcends his initial cautious separation of the linguistic from the geological, so as to 
discover their common ground. The geo-logical supercedes the ana-logical. 
Schelling’s comments here are consistent with Grant’s insistence on the “more 
than analogical” relation between disparate realms in Schelling’s work. Deleuze 
writes, for example, in imitation of Schelling, “Depth is like the famous geological 
line from NE to SW, the line which comes diagonally from the heart of things and 
distributes volcanoes.”50 Grant dubs such mimicry a failure, however: Schelling is “as 
different from the Deleuzian as from the Kantian.”51 This is all down to the “like” 
which appears–this is not Schellingian, but rather Kantian. Deleuze follows Kant in 
building a merely analogical bridge between nature and thought, physics and 
metaphysics (and by extension, geology and linguistics). Schelling’s bridge, on the 
contrary, is built of stone! Deleuze remains in thrall here to a logic of representation, 
whereas Schelling is more Deleuzian than Deleuze. For Schelling, “the likeness 
involved in such correspondences is not ideal or analogical, but physical.”52 
Linguistics and geology are to be welded together. 
 
 
5. Linguistics and Geology: The Weak Claim 
However, we are still not in a position to understand how this is the case. There is a 
weak and a strong claim here: first, words are analogous to rocks and, second, words 
are rocks. To get an idea of how the strong claim is possible, it is worth beginning 
with the weaker claim concerning the similarity of linguistics and geology. In order to 
do so, let us turn to the second “isolated beginning” of a Schellingian philosophy of 
language. This is located at the end of Schelling’s third 1802 lecture, On University 
Studies. 
Once again, we find language and geology juxtaposed. Schelling compares the 
hermeneutic faculty needed to study dead languages with the method required for 
studying the hidden strata of nature. In both, one needs to “recognise the living spirit” 
in a seemingly dead product, to discover, that is, the abyss of productivity underlying 
it. Schelling continues,  
 
Even those who investigate nature only empirically need to know her language in order to understand 
utterances which have become unintelligible to us. The same is true of philology in the highest sense of the 
term. The earth is a book made up of miscellaneous fragments dating from very different ages. Each mineral 
is a real philological problem. In geology we still await the genius who will analyse the earth and show its 
composition as Wolf [the 18th century German philologist] analysed Homer.53 
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We have here a claim very similar to one made a few years earlier by Novalis: 
“Similarity of historical geology and mineralogy to philology”.54 Schelling and 
Novalis both insist on the methodological parallels between the two disciplines. 
Why? Let us recall Schelling’s rejection of phenomenalism in his 
Naturphilosophie: by undercutting somatic physics with a dynamics of the productive 
forces which generate bodies, Schelling goes beyond what is phenomenally given to 
ground his Naturphilosophie in a non-phenomenological realm. To quote Grant,  
 
The fact that the Earth’s creatures are merely the ‘outward phenomenon’ of the proportions of forces, poses 
the challenge: if the ground cannot be sought in bodies, and if all bodies are accessible to sense, then the 
forces themselves are unintuitable.55 
 
A “physical abyss”56 thus opens up before the philosopher of nature—an unintuitable 
realm of immeasurable productivity. 
The attraction of geology given such considerations is obvious.57 Geology 
excavates beneath the surface of nature to its grounds; it makes possible a thinking of 
the non-phenomenal forces which ground reality. Schelling insists on this in a remark 
made contemporaneously with the lectures On University Studies: apart from 
geological research, “we have no analogue amongst the known processes for the 
process of… eruption.”58 Only geology can deal with the unruly eruptions which 
emerge out of extra-phenomenal realms. The first draft of the Weltalter insists on this 
point, 
 
The oldest formations of the earth bear such a foreign aspect that we are hardly in a position to form a 
concept of their time of origin or of the forces that were then at work. Everything that surrounds us refers 
back to an incredibly deep past… A mass of strata [is] laid one upon the other; the labour of centuries must 
be stripped away, in order to finally reach the ground.59 
 
The philological enterprise is, in essence, the same: a hermeneutical exercise at 
uncovering the hidden grounds beneath surface meaning. For example, etymology 
(the focus of The Deities of Samothrace) traces the language given to us in the present 
back to its hidden origins. Just like geology, therefore, philology strips away the 
sediment to uncover what is primordial. Both sciences proceed beyond the 
phenomenally given to the forces which generate them, and, as such, both venture into 
empirically inaccessible depths. 
This, therefore, is the similarity between geology and philology. What, however, of 
their identity? To understand this, a further excursus into Schellingian geology is 
required. 
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6. 1809 Inquiries: From Dynamics to Geology 
At the end of Schelling’s 1811 Bericht, having flagged up the “connection” 
between language and geology, Schelling continues: the study of language is one of 
those “subjects which push us back into the abyss of human nature”.60 To study 
language, therefore, is to peer into an abyss, and such abysses form the subject matter 
of Schelling’s Philosophical Inquiries into the Nature of Human Freedom. Moreover, 
it is with the Philosophical Inquiries that we also return to the question of religion in 
Grant’s Schellingianism. 
 
The role of religion in the Inquiries provides us with the answer to the second 
question with which this essay began: in what does a speculative approach to religion 
consist? In line with the “speculative process” outlined above, religion is conceived in 
the Inquiries as no longer determinative of philosophy in general, but rather relegated 
to a regional object of Naturphilosophie. Schelling task here is to present a “dynamics 
of religion”. Once more, non-linear recapitulation is the key. God and freedom are the 
self-recapitulation of the forces which constitute the natural world at a higher potency, 
just as the mental realm is. Freedom is “the final potentiating act… through which the 
whole of nature found its transfiguration… All philosophy strives only to find this 
highest expression.”61 Similar things are said of God: 
 
Nothing can be achieved at all by such attenuated conceptions of God [which] separate God as far as 
possible from all of nature. God is more of a reality than he is a mere moral world-order, and he has in him 
quite other and more vital activating powers than the barren subtlety abstract idealists ascribe to him. The 
abhorrence of all reality, which might sully the spiritual through any contact with it, must naturally blind the 
eye to the origin of evil too. Idealism, if it is not grounded in a vital realism, will become [an] empty and 
attenuated system.62 
 
God is an assemblage of natural forces too—and it is only philosophy’s disdain for 
nature (its “abhorrence of all reality”) which has blinded it to the fact that nature 
recapitulates in God. A doctrine of God, Schelling continues, “could only be 
developed from the fundamental principles of a genuine philosophy of nature” which 
“sought out the vital basis of nature”.63 
 
Nature self-recapitulates in God–such is Schelling’s overarching polemic in the 
Inquiries against those philosophers whose disdain for nature have blinded them to 
the physical connection of all things. Thus, the Inquiries ends by insisting that there is 
no need to rely on the Bible or historical faith in order to understand religion. Nature 
is a sufficient key to any theory of the divine: “We have an earlier revelation than any 
written one—nature. If the understanding of that unwritten revelation were 
inaugurated, the only true system of religion and science would appear.”64 Just as the 
original Schellingian project insisted that there is no gulf between the real and the 
mental, so too here Schellingian dynamics is extended even further, and consequently 
becomes even more “unconditioned”. 
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However, this is not the whole story. Schelling is no longer interested in providing 
a purely dynamic account of religion, but instead offers a geology of religion. This is 
not so much a substantial change as a shift in attitude. From the beginning, Schelling 
was aware of the non-phenomenality of the productivity out of which nature was 
generated. It is only, however, in 1809 that Schelling faces this issue head-on. 
Schelling here focuses even more extensively on the philology of geological 
excavation he had so briefly invoked in On University Studies. He writes in the 
Inquiries, 
 
The world as we now behold it is all rule, order and form; but the unruly lies ever in the depths as though it 
might again break through… This is the incomprehensible basis of reality in all things, the irreducible 
remainder which cannot be resolved into reason by the greatest exertion but always remains in the depths.65 
 
Schellingian dynamics has to deal with the “the unruly”. It is for this reason geology 
becomes Schelling’s new model for Naturphilosophie–a model (as we saw in regard 
to On University Studies) that can cope with the unruly abyss with which the 
philosopher is confronted. In the Inquiries, Naturphilosophie finally becomes 
“transcendental geology”.66 
The Inquiries follows On University Studies in re-appropriating for philosophy 
geology’s struggle with what is unruly, excessive and threatening. It is only geology 
which can cope with “a phenomenal catastrophism”67. It is this sustained conjunction 
of geological thought with a naturephilosophical account of God which has turned the 
stomach of so many readers of the Inquiries from the first (Eschenmayer and Jacobi) 
through to Manfred Frank. As Eschenmayer acutely observed on the work’s 
publication, 
 
Your essay on human freedom seems to me a complete transformation of ethics into physics, a consumption 
of the free by the necessary… of the moral by the natural, and above all a complete depotentiation of the 
higher into the lower order of things.68 
 
To which Grant adds, “We can image Eschenmayer’s shock: why does this work on 
the subject of freedom contain so much geology?”69 
 
The geological foundations of the Inquiries are fully manifest in the history of 
religion Schelling sketches. As one might expect, this historical sketch follows the 
unruly depths of nature as it self-recapitulates in increasingly higher potencies. Nature 
generates itself into fuller, more actualised forms. As time goes on, the basis self-
recapitulates in increasingly more ideal forms, transforming itself into light, spirit and 
finally love.70 However, (and it is here Schelling decisively moves beyond a 
“dynamics of religion” to a “geology of religion”) interspersed between these 
successive potentiations of nature into the divine are a series of catastrophes. For 
example, “Because the principle of the depths can never give birth for itself to true 
and complete unity, the time comes in which all this glory decays as through horrible 
disease, and finally chaos again ensues”71, or again,  
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At last there results the crisis in the turba gentium which overflow the foundations of the ancient world as 
once the waters of the beginning again covered the creations of primeval time.72 
 
History in the Inquiries incorporates a catastrophic flooding, or, in Grant’s words, “a 
geological eruption in the midst of the philosophy of freedom.”73 Naturphilosophie 
must not only chart the series of bodies generated through nature’s self-recapitulation, 
but also the “series of bodies repeatedly swept away by this periodic recapitulation of 
primal forces”.74 This is why a geological model is necessary. 
 
We are now in a position to understand the identity—and not just the similarity—
of philology and geology which Schelling intimated in On University Studies. 
Moreover, we are now able to do as the 1811 Bericht advises: think words in 
connection with the geological. As we have seen, religion is nature recapitulated: 
there is no separation between the two; rather, an identity. In the same way, following 
the Schellingian notion of non-linear recapitulation, rocks and words are nature in 
different potencies. Both philology and geology attempt to uncover exactly the same 
ground. The unruly itself is the ultimate goal of both endeavours. What is more, 
religion should now be added to the mix. Nature self-recapitulates its unruly basis in 
forming God just as much as in forming minerals and syllables. They all have the 
same ground (the unruly) and are generated by the same subject (productive nature). 
As such, religious studies, philology and geology are identical pursuits. This is no 
mere analogous relation, but a physical one. Just as we saw Schelling speak of the 
need to “cognise the physical in language”, so too the Inquiries insists upon 
“cognising the physical in God”. By so doing, language and religion are subjected to 
the speculative process: they are incorporated as regional subjects of an overarching, 
unconditioned Naturphilosophie.  
7. The Deities of Samothrace: Excavating Nature’s Experiments in Divinity 
To chart the unruly is to record nature’s experiments in religions and languages, 
and crucial to Schelling are nature’s past experiments, and especially the experimental 
catastrophes which seem to obey no laws. It is only by measuring such ancient test-
runs that Schelling hopes to unlock the secrets by which future experiments will 
succeed. He geologically, philologically and theologically excavates the manner in 
which the abyss of forces potentiated itself and disrupted its own potentiations over 
millions of years. 
The Deities of Samothrace is one such geological excavation of nature’s 
experimentation, and, as always, this language must be taken literally. If there is 
anything that we have learnt from the foregoing, it is the need to take Schelling at his 
word, to interpret his language literally, not metaphorically. Schelling’s ultimate 
concern in the Deities—the etymology of the names of the gods of the ancient 
Samothracian mystery-cult (the Cabiri)—is achieved by means of a very concrete and 
literal geological survey of the island itself. The work opens, 
 
The island of Samothrace rises from the northern part of the Aegean Sea… Ancient geographers surmised 
that great convulsions of nature afflicted these regions even up to human times. It may be that the waters of 
the Black Sea, raised simply by flooding, first broke through the Thracian Strait, and then through the 
Hellespont. Or that the force of a subterranean volcano altered the level of the waters. The oldest 
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Samothrace stories, transmuted into monuments exhibited in commemoration, preserved an account of this 
event, and from that time on they fostered the reverence and patronage of the native gods.75 
 
Geology is the starting point of the inquiry and, in particular, the geological irruption 
(commemorated in “the oldest Samothrace stories”) which triggered a new reverence 
for the divine among the people of Samothrace. The Samothracian mystery-cult, 
Schelling implies, was born from a “great convulsion of nature” (the “turba gentium” 
of the Inquiries). Schelling lingers over this circumstance further in a note to the 
paragraph, 
 
At that time when large tracts of Asia would have been covered continuously, others for a time, the 
lowlands of Samothrace also were inundated, as the inhabitants reported; on the highest mountain peaks 
they had sought aid with persistent vows to the native gods. Diodorus Siculus adds that around the 
circumference of the whole island still stand altars which identify the limits of the peril and the 
deliverance.76 
 
Schelling’s point could be mistaken for a Humean one: an ignorant humanity 
fabricated superstitions to cope with nature’s irregularity. However, nothing could be 
further from the case and Schelling never tired of heaping scorn on Enlightenment 
explanations of religion.77 Instead, Schelling’s point is that the names of the Cabiri 
commemorate and bear witness to this ancient natural catastrophe. As Schelling 
himself writes, the flooding was “transmuted into monuments exhibited in 
commemoration.” By “cognising the physical in language” and recognising “the 
connection” between the linguistic and the geological, an excavation of the names of 
the Cabiri can reveal how nature operates in its more catastrophic moments. For 
example, the name Axiokersus contains the Hebrew root hrs which, in turn, is 
connected to fire, and, in this way, it manifests the ancient wisdom that (according to 
Heraclitus): “The world is an eternal living fire, which at intervals… flares up and is 
extinguished.”78 The catastrophic unruliness of nature is implicitly contained in these 
names, and to etymologically analyse the names is also simultaneously to reveal the 
workings of nature itself. Recalling his evocation of nature in the Inquiries as “an 
earlier revelation than anything written” and “the only true system of religion and 
science”, Schelling here speaks of the “scientific system” preserved in the names of 
the Cabiri as “a primordial system older than all written documents, which is the 
common source of all religious doctrines and representations.”79 Schelling’s 
etymological analysis reveals nature as it operates over a time-span too great for 
human representation to bear. 
However, once again, to maintain that the names “bear witness” to natural 
catastrophe is to reduce a geological to a representational relation, and so to dilute 
Schelling’s intent. The names, in fact, are the unruly ground of this natural 
catastrophe recapitulated. Etymological excavation is (and does not merely “aid”) 
geological excavation. “The secret history of the gods”80 is that they are generated 
from the same forces as the turba gentium, and so “the hazardous path of philology”81 
is the same path taken by geology. The names of the Cabiri are not just analogous to 
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the system of potencies in nature; they are its recapitulation. They do not reflect 
nature, but repeat nature. 
This view is summed up in Schelling’s idiosyncratic translation of a Heraclitean 
fragment; a fragment in which, Schelling notes, “all of antiquity and the finer 
humanity… is reflected fully”: 
 
Das Eine weise Wesen will nicht das alleinige genannt seyn, den Namen Zeus will es! 
The One wise nature does not wish to be called that exclusively; it wishes the name ‘Zeus’.82 
 
Nature, that is, self-recapitulates in the divine names. 
 
 
8. Conclusion 
Such, then, is one possible answer to the two questions with which I began: what 
happens to language after the post-linguistic turn? and in what does a speculative 
approach to religion consist? According to Schelling, language and religion must 
undergo “the speculative process”, relegating them from philosophical media 
impeding our access to the world to regional objects of a speculative 
Naturphilosophie. A physics of language and a physics of religion are the preliminary 
result of such a philosophical operation, and they are thus the means by which 
Schelling himself passes the extensity test we posed of him. Naturphilosophie is 
unconditioned because it absorbs linguistics and theology. Moreover, according to 
Schelling, these two distinct fields of physical enquiry can be further united in a 
“geology of divine names”, an attempt to think together the abyss of forces 
recapitulated in both language and religion. Nature recurs and mutates into Zeus, 
Christ and Krishna, as well as into the names, “Zeus”, “Christ” and “Krishna”. What 
is more, the Schellingian philosopher of nature—if she truly wishes to practice an 
absolute, unconditioned form of philosophy—must follow nature even there. To pass 
Grant’s test of extensity, speculative philosophy must be willing to chart all of 
nature’s experiments. 
And this, in consequence, is precisely what is required of twenty-first century 
speculative philosophies. They must dare to pursue nature into its most esoteric 
phenomena, leaving behind their comfort zones of Lovecraftian monsters and 
Okenian slime, so as to go after those products of nature that sit less easily with their 
ethos; those products, that is, which contemporary speculative philosophies still need 
to incorporate so as to become genuinely unconditioned. We still await speculative 
accounts of the names of Allah and the words of the Nicene Creed. 
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